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In  the  past  20  years,  the  Slovenia  has  been  praised  as  the  richest  former 
socialist country, having accomplished the advancement from borrower into 
donor status at the World Bank and having entered the European Monetary 
Union as the first country from former socialist block. In the due course of 
transition  to  market,  Slovenia  adopted  the  gradualist  approach  to  economic 
reform,  emphasizing  gradual  privatization,  excessive  regulation  of  the  labor 
market and financial sector as well as the slow stabilization of public finances. 
In this paper, we review macroeconomic performance of Slovenia in past two 
decades in a comparative perspective. The paper outlines the growth trajectory 
of Slovenia from the onset of Habsburg Empire to the present. We showed that 
until  1939,  Slovenia  has  almost  fully  converged  to  the  income  per  capita 
frontier of Austria and Italy while the income per capita diverged substantially 
in  the  period  1945-1990  from  Western  European  frontier.  We  review  the 
contours  of  labor  market  protectionism,  state  dominance  in  banking  and 
financial  sector  and  emergence  of  the  corporate  oligarchy  as  the  main 
symptoms of stalled economic performance given a substantial differential in 
income  per  capita  between  Slovenia  and  EU15.  Moreover,  we  demonstrate 
how former communist elites transformed into powerful networks of interest 
groups  which  preserved  status  quo  from  socialist  period  through  systemic 
blockade of key economic reforms to stabilize public finances in the light of 
age-related pressures and to boost productivity growth and structural change. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
2011 year marked the twentieth anniversary of political independence in Slovenia.  It was a 
momentous date, marking the longest period of state independence since the country ceded 
from the former socialist Yugoslavia in 1991. After twenty years of political independence, it 
is essential to examine the country’s economic progress in more depth. 
 
In the last two decades, Slovenia has often been represented in the international media as 
the most successful ex-communist state, having accomplished Euro-Atlantic integration as 
well as being the first former socialist bloc country to enter the Eurozone. The consequence 
of judging the country’s economic performance on a purely comparative basis has been to 
neglect  the  deeper  analysis  of  long-term  macroeconomic  patterns  and  determinants  of 
growth.  Four  decades  of  flawed  Marxist  economics  have  produced  distorted  economic 
assumptions, and led to a significant divergence from academic developments in the Anglo-
Saxon world.  This has resulted in a virtually non-existent understanding of Slovenia’s past 
economic development. 
 
II. Macroeconomic History in a Nutshell 
 
It  is  often  presumed  that  Slovenia  had  a  poor  economic  performance  before  joining  the 
socialist Yugoslavia, as measured by income per capita. Yet evidence from the Habsburg 
Empire (Good, 1994) suggests, via quantitative indices, that differences in terms of income 
per capita can be noted between different Slovenian regions. These estimates suggest that 
in 1913 regions such as Littoral, Carinthia and Styria sustained comparatively high levels of 
income  per  capita,  comparable  to  that  of  Imperial  Austria,  whilst  Carniola  continually 
experienced low income per capita and a low rate of growth prior to World War 1. In 1913, 
the Littoral region (Gorizia, Gradiska, Trieste and parts of Istria) enjoyed the sixth-highest 
income per capita in Imperial Austria. At this time the level of nominal wages in Trieste had 
also converged to the Prague level. 
 
The emergence of the first Yugoslav state, renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, was 
accompanied by divergent levels of income per capita across the country’s different regions. 
Although  the  Kingdom  of  Yugoslavia  established  national  income  accounts  in  1938, 
estimates by Broadberry & Klein (2008) suggest that by 1937 Yugoslavia experienced one of 
the lowest levels of GDP per capita in Europe. In terms of constant 1990 international dollars, 
it was one of Europe’s most underdeveloped countries in 1938. An observation by the Library 
of Congress (1992) described pre-war Yugoslavia as a country of stark economic divergence; 
between  the  highly-developed  North  and  the  less-developed  Southern  regions.  In  1937 Yugoslav income per capita was 30 percent below the world average, whilst the eradication 
of feudalism left 75 percent of the population below the official poverty line. Slovenia however 
enjoyed a substantial advantage in terms of income per capita relative to other parts of the 
Kingdom. Ljubo Sirc has convincingly argued that by 1939 the level of real wages in Slovenia 
had been steadily converging to the Austrian level. The empirical regularities of income per 
capita patterns suggest an unequivocal convergence to the steady state. If Slovenia enjoyed 
income per capita 100 percent above Yugoslav average, then in 1937 the level of income per 
capita in Slovenia represented 78 percent of the Austrian level in the same year. It can thus 
be  seen  that the  adoption  of  the  socialist  economic  model  led  to  a  disastrous  economic 
outcome. 
 
In  1950,  the  level  of  income  per  capita  dropped  to  34  percent  of  the  Austrian  level  and 
remained intact ever since. One could not describe the Yugoslav miracle (Sapir, 1986) in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s as a period of sustained growth, since the engine of growth did 
not  incorporate  technological  change  and  steady  productivity  gains.    Instead  it  was 
symptomatic of capital deepening based on foreign aid and credit-fuelled expansion amid 
rachitic productivity growth. From 1960 to 1975 Yugoslavia’s annual average growth rate was 
5.42 percent, whilst from 1975 to 1989 the annual rate of growth declined to 1.04 percent; 
one  of  the  lowest  in  developing  countries  (Rodrik,  1998).  The  foregone  experience  of 
hyperinflation  and  the  consequent  collapse  of  the  Yugoslav  communist  economic  model 
resulted in a significant cumulative output decline during the transition from socialism to a 
market economy. 
 
III. Unpleasant Growth Arithmetic 
 
The  evidence  suggests  that  the  socialist  period  was  detrimental  to  the  long-term  rate  of 
productivity  growth.    This  arose  from  the  distortion  of  incentives  inherent  to  the  socialist 
economic system. From 1972 to 1980, Slovenia’s annual rate of economic growth tottered 
below  the  average  of  high-income  socialist  countries.  The  Czech  Republic,  Estonia  and 
Poland  grew  at  a  far  higher  annual  rate,  revealing  a  pattern  in  income  per  capita 
convergence; even though the difference in the level of output per capita remained significant 
throughout the period. At this time output grew by 2.14 percent annually; far below the rate of 
growth in neighboring Austria (3.4 percent) and Italy (3.32 percent) during the same period.
1 
This  caused  the  divergence  in  per capita  income,  which  occurred  despite  a  substantially 
higher  investment-to-GDP  ratio.  This  translated  into  capital  deepening  without  efficiency 
                                                 
1 The estimates of long-run growth rates are based on International Macroeconomic Data Set, provided by U.S. 
Department of Agriculture: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/#HistoricalMacroTables gains, whilst the growth of total factor productivity stalled. As Figure 1 succinctly suggests, 
the level of real income per capita in Slovenia had stalled relative to the EU15 during the 
socialist period and did not grow significantly faster than the EU15 average throughout the 
post-socialist transition to signal permanent and robust cross-country convergence. 
 
Figure 1 [Near here] 
 
It is telling to compare this case with those of Slovenia and Malta, demonstrated in Figure 2. 
In  1950  Malta  was  one  of the most  impoverished  countries  in  Southern  Europe
2 - falling 
behind even Bulgaria - whilst Slovenia enjoyed the highest income-per-capita level in Central 
Europe. However from 1960 to 1975 and in 1989, Malta sustained a 5.9 percent average rate 
of economic growth, which meant that it took 12 years for income per capita to double; whilst 
Slovenia’s average rate of growth meant that it took 30 years for income per capita to double. 
In 1991, both countries enjoyed the same per capita income. 
 
Figure 2 [Near here] 
 
The  failure  to  boost  the  long-term  rate  of  economic  growth  is  key  to  understanding  the 
narrowing gap in income per capita between Slovenia and other transition countries. For 
instance, Slovakia’s lower initial per capita income in 1991 would imply that in the long run 
the country will grow one percentage point faster than Slovenia on a permanent basis. In 
1991, therefore, Slovenia enjoyed 64 years of time-distance advantage ahead of Slovakia. 
Annual rate of growth estimates by the IMF (World Economic Outlook, 2011) suggest that in 
the short term Slovakia is set to grow by 2 percentage points faster than Slovenia. Hence the 
difference in the time to catch up would narrow to 26 years respectively. Differences in per 
capita income can ultimately be explained by differences in the institutional setup and the 
nature  of  public  policy.  Transition  growth  figures  (Summers  &  Heston,  2007;  Economic 
Research Service, 2010) suggest that long-term rates of growth are systematically higher in 
countries  that  have  adopted  shock  therapy  (Czech  Republic,  Poland)    than  those  which 
followed  the  gradualist  approach  to  economic  reform  (Hungary,  Slovenia).  Countries  that 
adopted  shock  therapy  have  also  weathered  the  financial  crisis  better  than  gradualist 
countries;  emphasizing  the  strength  of  a  liberalized  financial  sector  and  the  flexibility  of 




                                                 
2 Apostolides (2008) estimated the average GDP per capita growth rate for Malta during the interwar period 
(1921-1938) at 0.5-1.5 percent which characterized the country as the slowest-growing Southern European 
country prior to World War 2.  
IV. The Rise of Gradualism 
 
Critiques of curvature in post-socialist transition over the last two decades have often been 
accompanied by rigorous and nonchalant attacks from the intellectual fathers of Slovenian 
transition. After ceding from Yugoslavia, Slovenia pursued a rigorously gradualist approach 
to  transition.  Macroeconomic  indicators  suggested  a  continuous  output  decline  and 
hyperinflation;  inherited  from  the  Yugoslav  era.  One  account  by  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction  and  Development  (EBRD)  suggests  that  Slovenia  suffered  the  largest 
cumulative  output  decline  amongst  high-income  transition  countries  (Slovenia,  Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland), despite having adopted a gradualist approach to 
economic reform;  in an attempt to absorb the institutional shock that precipitated the early 
stage  of  transition.  The  ultimate  decision  to  pursue  gradualism  rested  mainly  on  the 
assumption that the composition of trade flows and enterprise restructuring would decrease 
in magnitude over time. 
 
The proposal by Jeffrey Sachs (Sachs & Pleskovic, 1994) to launch rapid privatization led to 
a significant disruption for post-communist nomenclature which favoured mass-privatization 
based on dispersed ownership – stemming from the premise that such an initiative would 
limit foreign direct investment. Early transition reinforced the mirage that social ownership 
could be efficient. The losses of the corporate and banking sector were facilitated by soft 
budget  constraints  that  further  delayed  enterprise  restructuring;  the  essential  measure  of 
maturity  from  post-socialist  transition.  A  study  by  prominent  authors  (Pohl  et.  al,  1997) 
examined evidence from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia - during the period 1992-1995 - to determine which economic policies were 
most conducive to enterprise restructuring. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that rapid 
privatization - based on concentrated rather than dispersed ownership, and with hard budget 
constraints and restrained wage increases - is the best facilitator of enterprise restructuring. 
The Slovenian episode of privatization, which was based on dispersed ownership and the 
sale of assets by special investment funds, eventually became subject to a typical example 
of capture by insider-owners, who took an informational advantage by inflationary loans. This 
later  became  an  insider-information  spiral,  where  insiders  gained  considerable  ownership 
premium  at  the  expense  of  external  shareholders,  who  suffered  from  a  poor  level  of 
protection. 
 
The  consequences  of  privatizing  state-owned  companies  on  an  ‘insider’  basis  proved 
disastrous when judging both the dynamics and the progress of enterprise restructuring. The 
evidence (Transition Report, 1998) suggests that by 1998 the Slovenian private sector was  marked as having the lowest share in GDP amongst Central European states, constituting 
just 50 percent of the total, compared to 75 percent in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The 
fragility  of  the  private  sector  gradually  evolved  into  a  rigid  business  environment  and  a 
sustained lack of incentives to instigate full enterprise restructuring. Moreover, the EBRD 
estimated that enterprise restructuring had stalled since the late 1990s - an estimation which 
was  confirmed  during  the  recent  financial  crisis  when  state-owned  companies  with  poor 
corporate governance and insufficient restructuring were particularly affected/hit. 
 
The  2008/2009  financial  crisis  was  no  panacea  to  the  fragile  banking  sector.  The 
privatization of Nova Ljubljanska Banka (NLB), Slovenia’s biggest bank, had stalled several 
times.  This had occurred despite the fact that stress-tests had clearly suggested that the 
bank would not be able to withstand a bold systemic liquidity shock, given an over-leveraged 
balance  sheet.  Since  the  crisis,  NLB  losses  have  further  been  cushioned  by  continuous 
budgetary recapitalizations which have acted as a classic bailout mechanism. This suggests 
that the bank’s overall portfolio suffers heavily from a myriad of bad loans – a suggestion 
recently affirmed by the Moody rating agency, which further lowered the bank’s overall credit 
rating. 
 
The Government owns two-thirds of banking sector assets, including the three-largest banks. 
A concerted effort to boost far-reaching privatization and systematic restructuring has failed, 
mostly because of the pervasive influence of a network of former-communist politicians and 
businessmen. They favour direct influence in capturing the banking sector so as to establish 
and  secure  favourable  lending  relationships.  So  far,  the  absence  of  a  privatization 
mechanism has produced a weak and unaccountable banking sector.  This encouraged the 
high  quantity  of  direct  loans  for  corporate  takeovers  prior  to  the  crisis,  which  ignored 
corporate finance fundamentals and later triggered the collapse of the SBI20 stock market, - 
the most dramatic collapse of any stock market index in the history of advanced economies. 
The  only  viable  option  to  liberalize  the  banking  sector  would  be  to  enact  a  rigorous 
privatization of the state-owned banking sector to foreign institutional investors.  The degree 
of  systemic  and  hidden  corruption  in  the  Slovenian  financial  sector  is  so  high,  that 
privatization  to  domestic  owners  would  not  resolve  the  inefficiencies  produced  by  twenty 
years of state ownership. 
 
V. Corruption, Judiciary and the Oligarchs 
 
Although  Slovenia’s  ranking  has  significantly  improved  on  Transparency  International’s 
Corruption Perception Index, the degree of hidden corruption is perceived as/understood to 
be  significant  and  persistent. The rise  of oligarchs,  who  have  exacerbated state capture, allowing  for  corporate  takeovers  and  the  dismissal  of  regulatory  authorities,  is  attributed 
above all to systemic corruption arising from influence. Administrative corruption, which is 
difficult  to  distinguish  and  ascertain  as  an  empirical  regularity,  is  assigned  a  minor  role 
(Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000). As Slovenia embarked on its gradualist approach to 
economic  reform,  former  communist  elites  were  given  space/time  to  transform  into  a 
powerful network of politicians, civil servants and businessmen - a network accustomed to a 
predatory  form  of  capitalism,  shaped  by  the  distorted  moral  foundations  of  communist 
ideology. 
 
Regulatory  authorities  and  judiciaries  were  hindered  from  investigating  and  acting  upon 
these  attempts  at  state  capture  due  to  the  lack  of  an  independent  judiciary.  Such 
independence  is  defined  as  a  separation  from  political  influence,  but  it  also  includes  an 
adherence to  the  principles  of  liberal  democracy  (such as the  rule  of  law),  adherence to 
contract  enforcement  and  adherence  to  the  principles  of  fairness  in  judicial  trial. 
Consequently, the fragility of rule-of-law institutions in Slovenia increased the demand for 
public regulation, as a mechanism against social inequities arising from the redistribution of 
resources through rent-seeking and other unproductive (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994: Alesina & 
Angeletos, 2005; Murphy, et. al., 1993). The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that social 
distrust creates public demand for higher regulation, which further discourages the formation 
of social trust (Aghion et. al, 2008). In 1994, when Index of Economic Freedom released its 
annual report, Slovenia enjoyed the lowest and least stable functioning judicial system in 
Central Europe. In Figure 3, it can be seen that the level of economic freedom in Slovenia 
remained repeatedly low compared to other countries. The fact that the level of economic 
freedom  in  less-developed  countries  such  as  Rwanda,  Cape  Verde  and  Kazakhstan  is 
perhaps the most compelling evidence suggesting that the socialist economic legacy with 
poor  contract  enforcement,  inefficient  public  sector  and  endemic  corruption  has  not  been 
effectively dismantled at all. 
 
Figure 3 [Near here] 
 
One could trace the relative malfunctioning of the Slovenian judicial system to its legal origins.   
Recent studies (La Porta et. al. 2008) overwhelmingly suggest that countries with a civil law 
system suffer from lower economic outcomes than those with a common-law equivalent. But 
in  our  example,  this  particular  notion  fails  to  explain  why  post-socialist  countries  –  who 
adhere to the latter yet fail to incorporate principles of substantive justice –, have performed 
poorly  in  comparison  to  countries  with  German,  civil-law,  legal  origins.    These  civil-law 
countries have generally managed   to at least ensure the continuity and stable functioning of 
the rule of law. The failure of the judicial system to adhere to these principles in post-socialist states has been caused mainly by the complete absence of lustration, which could expel 
former  communist  officials  from  chairmanships  in  public  institutions  –  as  occurred  in  the 
Czech Republic in the early 1990s. 
 
The  very  absence  of  effective  contract  enforcement  allowed  for  various  regulatory 
shortcomings, emerging from the fact that basic enforcement mechanisms were governed by 
the  influence  of  post-communist  networks,  and  not  by  independent  legal  principles.  This 
influence  extended  beyond  the  scope  of  state  administration,  and  began  to  also  affect 
institutions in the conduct of private affairs. 
 
One  example  of  this  is  the  sustained  influence  of  the  former  nomenclature  in  higher 
academia. This monopolisation worked to stifle the implementation of new ideas and policies. 
In  various  discussions  and  debates,  the  academic  nomenclature  has  dismissed  new 
proposals - such as labour market liberalization, openness to foreign direct investment and a 
flat-rate income tax - as being flawed, dangerous or primitive. The perils of the economic 
nationalism which facilitated the rise of the corporate oligarchy were considered almost non-
existent  and  were,  by  and  large,  ignored.  Left-leaning  media,  oligarchic  businessmen, 
nationalist  politicians  and  (in)dependent  academia  argued  forcefully  for  abandoning 
proposals of lower tax rates, privatization and labour market liberalization. In various public 
policy discussions, the intellectual architects of gradualism proved themselves ignorant of the 
consequences of economic nationalism. 
 
The early warnings of stock market fragility, occurring in the aftermath of the 1989 euphoria, 
were blissfully ignored - despite the fact that the Slovenian stock market echoed a similar 
pattern of volatility to China. In spite of the buoyant growth of the stock market - fuelling 
significant  asset-price  inflation  -  the  stock  market  for  major  state-owned  companies 
experienced a significant drive from fundamentals. Price-earnings ratios were surpassing net 
dividend  yields  considerably,  suggesting  a  significant  spike  in  insider-information  trading, 
which leaves the shareholder to bear all the cost, and encourages insiders to take greater 
and greater risks. Eventually, the collapse of the SBITOP, the Slovenian blue-chip market, 
demonstrated  the  pitfalls  of  economic  nationalism  –a  policy  which  had  worked  to  boost 
oligarchic entrepreneurship by means of powerful nomenclature networks aided by academia, 
the media and short-sighted policies. Gradually, Slovenia began to witness the emergence of 
a Russian-style oligarchy which accumulated an enormous wealth through political channels. 
It  did  so  by  violating  the  rules  of  the  game  and  overriding  sound  corporate  governance 
principles. At the same time it amassed political power, ultimately facilitating state capture in 
the early stage of transition. Therefore, the Slovenian version of gradualism could be labeled as maintenance of the status quo, since key areas of economic reform - such as privitisation, 
competition policy, and the restructuring of enterprises - remained virtually intact. 
 
 
VI. Sclerosis of the Labour Market 
 
The evolution of the labour market in the early stages of transition was facilitated by a set of 
structural shocks that led to a downward adjustment in real wages. The labour market of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s was characterized by declining labour productivity and declining 
output per capita. It is nonetheless essential to underline the structural characteristics of the 
post-socialist  labour  market.  As  Woodward  (1995)  suggested,  reported  rates  of 
unemployment  in  socialist  Yugoslavia  differed  markedly  from  actual  unemployment  rates. 
Latent unemployment was a characteristic of the labour market in Slovenia at the onset of 
transition to  a  market  economy.  After  the  disintegration  of  Yugoslavia,  the  labour market 
suffered from a chronic lack of productive capacity, which reflected low actual comparative 
rates of human capital investment in a socialist economy. Therefore, Slovenia’s entry into 
post-socialist transition was earmarked by an excessive labour capacity that could not solve 
the  problem  of  persistent  latent  unemployment.  Excessive  labour  capacity  stemmed 
generally from low levels of human capital, but particularly from the trade disintegration which 
followed  cessation  from  the  Yugoslav  federation.    The  Slovenian  manufacturing  sector 
suffered chronically after this event. 
 
The  absence  of  large-scale  enterprise  restructuring  complemented  rising  labour  market 
rigidity, which was characterized by increased trade union power.  This effectively prevented 
productivity improvements at the firm level by shielding workers in both private and public 
sectors  from  competitive  pressure  to  relocate  talent  into  more  productive  uses  and  to 
facilitate human capital investment. Lack of enterprise restructuring had effectively acted as a 
substitute for efficiency gains from human capital investment. If human capital investment 
(Acemoglu, 1995) is not provided as an impetus for labour market transformation, excess 
labour capacity, an inherent characteristic of socialist unemployment, is channeled through 
higher rates of unemployment. Trade unions, once the hallmark of the socialist economy, 
have  swiftly  established  an  extremely  rigid  system  of  labour  market  institutions  by 
establishing  collective  bargaining  schemes  as  the  means  of  avoiding  the  facilitation  of 
productivity improvements through human capital investment. 
 
The architects of gradualism had not envisaged the transformation of the labour market at all. 
The rigidity of the labour market mechanism, measured by the regulation of hiring and firing 
and the magnitude of labour cost per effective unit of output, acted merely as a substitute for comprehensive  restructuring  and  hindered  the  necessary  relocations  of  talent,  skill  and 
human capital investment. 
 
The notion of labour market liberalization originally proposed by Jeffrey Sachs in 1994 was 
dismissed  not  only  by  the  media  but  also  by  politicians  and  trade  union  leaders  who 
emphasized temporary job security concerns in the early stage of transition. But, as Milton 
Friedman  once  brilliantly  noted,  nothing  is  as  permanent  as  a  temporary  government 
programme. In the early years of transition, the labour market did not gradually evolve into a 
mechanism for the reallocation of talent and human capital, but into an unhealthy system of 
job security. This was especially so for public-sector workers where dismissals have been 
impossible  to  enforce,  therefore  emanating  in  a  deadweight  loss,  compensated  by  an 
increase in the share of government spending as a proportion of total GDP. 
 
In  1992,  the  rate  of  real  wages  for  civil  servants  and  public  sector  employees  grew 
considerably. By 1995, government spending as a share of GDP had increased from 41.1 
percent in 1991 to 54 percent. The rise of real wages  for civil servants has been problematic 
mostly because the adjustment of real wages  has not been linked  to the short-term rate of 
productivity growth; exacerbating significant pressure on labour costs and, hence, the annual 
rate of inflation. The boons of public sector employment naturally resulted in the diversion of 
labour resources from the private to the public sector. It should not be concluded that the 
private  sector’s  labour  market  is  unaffected  by  corruption,  rigidity  and  shortcomings  of 
unadjusted  wage  determination  however,  since  these  characteristics  are  intrinsic  to  the 
labour market in contemporary Slovenia. 
 
A highly rigid labour market, plagued by union intervention in the determination of wages and 
labour  contracts,  is  highly  susceptible  to  moral  hazard;  since  unionised  workers  enjoy 
considerable wage premiums, yet also create a deadweight loss from a rigid labour supply. 
In the case of the public sector, this is borne by taxpayers. The empirical evidence (Mattina & 
Gunnarsson,  2007)  suggests  that  despite  substantially  high  earnings  for  public  sector 
workers, the public sector suffers from low expenditure efficiency, particularly in health care, 
education and social protection: 
 
“Spending on health care, education, and social protection is relatively high in 
Slovenia  without  achieving  correspondingly  better  outcomes.  Inefficiencies 
appear to stem from the financing mechanisms for social services, institutional 
arrangements,  and  the  weak  targeting  of  social  benefits.  In  addition,  the 
composition of spending appears to be strongly tilted towards nondiscretionary 
items that reduce the fiscal room for maneuver. Greater flexibility is needed to 
facilitate the reallocation of relatively inefficient expenditure into higher priorities. In this manner, medium-term expenditure rationalization can focus on reducing 
inefficient outlays rather than restraining traditionally flexible components of the 
budget, such as public investment.” 
 
The most formative characteristic of the post-socialist labour market in Slovenia is a benign 
productivity  growth  which  remained  inherent  to  the  structure  of  the  labour  market. 
Throughout  the  transition,  the  gains  from  rising  productivity  have  been  modest.  Figure  4 
demonstrates  that  throughout  the  transition  period,  the  growth  of  labour  productivity, 
ultimately driving the level of income per capita, has been characterised by slow growth and 
yet substantial gap between Slovenia and EU15. In 2006, the level of labour productivity has 
not  increased  at  all.  Moreover,  from  2006  to  2010,  the  level  of  labour  productivity 
deteriorated  from  83.1  percent  of  the  EU  average  to  81.6  percent.  The  convergence  of 
productivity took a full-fledged course within the EU. Unfortunately, the level of productivity in 
Slovenia has converged by very little to the frontier of high-income countries in the EU. On 
the other hand, countries that enforced shock therapy and growth-oriented policies such as 
Poland,  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia  have  experienced  a steady  convergence  of  labour 
productivity to the high-income frontier, although the difference is still substantial. However, 
high-income  transition  countries  (Poland,  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia)  have  increased  their 
productivity levels substantially relative to Slovenia. In 1991, Slovenia sustained two-thirds of 
the EU productivity level whilst Slovakia’s productivity level represented half the level of the 
EU average. As mentioned above, productivity growth in Slovenia has stalled since 2006 
whilst Slovakia has experienced brisk productivity growth. In 2010, Slovakia’s level of labour 
productivity represented 82.6 percent of the EU average whilst Slovenia achieved about 81.9 
percent of the EU average. This clearly demonstrates the benefits of growth-oriented policies 
pursued in Slovakia since 2000, and the pitfalls of consensus-based economic policies which 
are  characterised  by  high  taxation,  rigid  labour  markets  and  a  state-dominated  financial 
sector. 
 
Figure 4 [Near here] 
 
Whilst Slovakia has begun to reform its taxation system, privatise its state-owned industries 
and liberalise its financial sector, Slovenian policymakers have merely revived the old notions 
of social justice as a way to maintain the status quo.  This has yielded immense political 
rents by favouring particular interest groups (Mrkaic & Pezdir, 2007) in the labour market.  
Yet  rent-seeking  without  system-wide  productivity  growth  has  resulted  in  productivity 
stagnation to such a degree that Slovenia can no longer boast the highest productivity level 
amongst other post-socialist states. 
 
 
 VII. State Capture of Public Finance 
 
The transition to political independence was marked by acute problems of poor infrastructure 
and low-efficiency labour, which required systemic restructuring.  Yet the extensive latent 
unemployment rate ultimately translated into significant structural unemployment.  Uniquely, 
policymakers  chose  to  address  persistent  structural  unemployment  by  altering  the 
parameters of the public pension system. In particular, economic policy chose to follow the 
gradualist prescription by lowering the effective age of retirement to very low levels, enabling 
the structurally unemployed to avert human capital investment in the labour market and enter 
retirement. Although lowering the effective retirement age to a level below actuarially justified 
levels  proved  a  popular  political  measure,  it  posed  a  significant  threat  to  the  long-term 
stability of public finance, which gradualism had simply overlooked. 
 
The impact of macroeconomic disequilibrium was immediate. From 1990 to 1995, the level of 
government spending increased to over 54 percent of GDP.  Spending on the elderly also 
grew significantly. The divergence of old-age spending from actuarially-fair levels and the 
subsidization of early-retirement has placed an irreversible burden on the stability of long-
term public finance. In the last two decades, when economic policymakers became aware of 
the  consequences  of  these  transitional  retirement  policies,  any  attempt  to  increase  the 
effective  age  of  retirement  has  been  hailed  by  trade  unions  as  the  destruction  of  the 
Slovenian  social  state.  This  rhetoric,  reminiscent  of  the  old  socialist  days,  has  proved 
significantly detrimental for the reform of the public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system. 
 
Projections by the European Commission have suggested that Slovenia possesses one of 
the most rapidly ageing populations in Europe; only behind the Southern part of the continent. 
Estimates  suggest  that  by  2030  40  percent  of the  population  will  be  dependent  on  age-
related  spending.  By  2050,  the  old-age  dependency  ratio  is  forecast  to  increase  by  an 
additional 15 percentage points, reaching 55.6 percent in the corresponding year. The total 
fertility  rate  has  also  been  declining  since  the  late  1980s.  For  the  period  2005-2010, 
Slovenia’s  average  fertility  rate  was  eleventh  lowest  in  the  world.    This,  coupled  with  a 
retirement age which in 2008 was around 59 years on average, poses significant threats to 
Slovenia’s future. 
 
Continuous lowering of the effective retirement age has exerted a strong pressure on the rise 
of age-related expenditures. By 2010, public pension expenditure represented 11 percent of 
GDP.  By 2050, expenditure on public pensions is forecast to reach 18.3 percent of GDP- 
only falling behind Portugal (20.8 percent of GDP) and Cyprus (19.8 percent of GDP). The extraordinary increase in the level of age-related expenditure is not exclusively attributable to 
the changing demographic landscape, despite Slovenia’s significantly aging population. 
 
The  most  distinctive  characteristic  of  the  Slovenian  PAYG  pension  system  is  unearned 
benefits. Although the notion of unearned benefits is the cornerstone of social justice, its 
Slovenian manifestation also deviates substantially from the rationale of actuarial fairness, 
which  forms  the  basis  of  the  contributory  principle  in  PAYG  pension.  Unearned  pension 
benefits have been a key feature of Slovenia’s waning public pension system. Recipients 
include former generals, war veterans, civil servants, public officials, academics and even 
chimney-sweeps. These recipients have accumulated net pension wealth not on the basis of 
contributory principles, but as the result of special privileges, sustained by the continuation of 
rent-seeking and interest-group influence in Slovenia. In 2010, the magnitude of unearned 
pension benefits amounted to €367 million, or just over 1 percent of GDP.
3 Moreover the net 
present value of pension liabilities increases considerably if one takes into account future 
benefits.  A recent study by the Bank for International Settlements has estimated that the 
size of Slovenian net pension liabilities will increase to 291 percent of GDP by 2050, (if future 
net pension liabilities are discounted by 3 percent).  This amounts to the second-highest ratio 
in the Eurozone, only behind Portugal. 
 
The  removal  of  unearned  pension  benefits  from  the  public  pension  system  would 
substantially reduce the pressure on long-term fiscal solvency. It would also reinforce the 
importance  of  the  contributory  principle  and  actuarial  fairness  in  the  state  pension.  The 
magnitude of unearned benefits embedded in the public pension system demonstrates state 
capture in the public pension system. It also demonstrates the persistence of interest-group 
pressure  and  their  strength  as  powerful  coalitions.  In  Slovenia  this  phenomenon  has 
translated into the near fiscal insolvency of the state pension system in the medium term. 
Gradualism’s  strategy  of  inducing  early-retirement  in  order  to  reduce  unemployment  has 
failed. 
 
The  result  of  this  strategy  has  been  to  produce  significant  intergenerational  income 
imbalances, as well as further rigidities in the labour market and low employment growth.  
Post-gradualist resistance to comprehensive pension reform has also indicated a preference 
for maintaining the status quo and appeasing powerful interest groups. Yet maintenance of 
the status quo threatens to ultimately result in fiscal default. 
 
                                                 
3 I am thankful to Bernard Brščič for providing estimates on the cost of unearned pension benefits in 
the share of GDP.  VIII. Towards Shock Therapy 
 
Slovenia’s  economic  performance  in  the  last  twenty  years  was  initially  marked  by 
macroeconomic stabilization and low levels of public debt. However from the second half of 
the  1990s,  the  rate  of  total  factor  productivity  growth  –which  indicates  the  level  of 
technological  progress  -  had  stalled  (Mrkaic,  2002),  reaching  negligible  levels.  The 
stagnation  of  labour  productivity  from  2006  onwards  suggests  that  economic  growth  in 
Slovenia has been characterized by a capital deepening that eventually diminished the rate 
of  economic  growth.    Slovenia’s  transition  to  market  had  not  been  accompanied  by 
enterprise  restructuring  and  large-scale  privatization.  Unlike  other  high-income  transition 
countries,  a  thorough  privatization  of  state-owned  companies  did  not  occur,  often  being 
undermined by economic nationalism and resistance to foreign direct investment. This lack of 
enterprise restructuring boosted a wave of resistance to structural change which, coupled 
with  poor  contract  enforcement,  eventually  led  to  a  weak  and  fragile  private  sector, 
accounting for little more than 50 percent of GDP. 
 
A rigid and inflexible labour market, the most penetrating socialist legacy, has generated rigid 
wage determination and rigid employment legislation, characterized by significant trade union 
intervention. The intervention of unions in the centralisation of collective bargaining and the 
enforcement of inflexibility in the labour market has resulted in disastrous consequences. 
Empirical evidence suggests a significant correlation between the degree of a rigidity and 
insulation from competitive pressures in a labour market and low productivity growth.  The 
aforementioned  features  of  the  Slovenian  labour  market  has  caused  the  stagnation  of 
productivity growth to such an extent that in 2007 Slovakia overtook Slovenia in the rate of 
productivity convergence to the other members of the EU. 
 
The 2008/2009 financial crisis has caused a significant decline in aggregate production and 
the slow subsequent growth since 2010. Growth prospects in the medium term suggest that 
Slovenian income per capita is not converging with high-income European countries.  To 
boost  long-term  economic  growth  and  facilitate  technological  progress,  the  course  of 
economic policy should not aim to preserve the status quo, a principle which has dominated 
national  politics  ever  since  political  independence.  Instead,  economic  policies  should 
prioritise long-term growth. 
 
First, policy reform should include rigorous and penetrating reformation of the tax system, 
aimed at the abolition of corporate income tax and the adoption of flat-rate income tax; in 
order to encourage labour supply and productivity growth. In fact, Slovenia is suffering from one of the highest effective tax burdens, measured as a share of GDP. In 2009 the effective 
tax  rate,  which  includes  social  security  and  mandatory  health  insurance  contributions, 
amounted to 55 percent - one of the highest rates in the world. 
 
Secondly, it should begin to liberalise the labour market. Much empirical evidence suggests 
the  negative  relationship  between  labour  market  rigidity  and  productivity  growth.  A 
comparison  of  overall  labour  market  regulation  in  a  cross-section  of  OECD  countries 
suggests that the labour market in Slovenia is constrained by excessively-regulated wage 
determination, employment contracts and entry-exit conditions, making it one of the most 
regulated labour markets in the OECD after Portugal and Germany. 
 
Thirdly,  policies  should  aim  at  a  transparent  and  immediate  privatization  of  state-owned 
production on a significant scale, as well as liberalization of the banking and financial sector, 
whilst ensuring effective enforcement of competition protection. Poorly enforced competition 
protection  and  state  dominance  in  banking, finance  and telecommunications  is the major 
constraint  for  maturing  from  a  transitional  to  a  market  economy.  The  evidence  again 
suggests  that  better  corporate  governance,  financial  fundamentals  and  market  outcomes 
follow privatization. Privatization and the encouragement of market competition is perhaps 
the simplest way to tackle the power of interest groups who extract immense rents from the 
public ownership of large-scale firms. 
 
Finally, the reform of a fragile and fiscally-bankrupt pension system should not be postponed. 
The net pension liabilities currently implicit in the state pension system have raised serious 
concerns  over  the  actuarial  fairness  of  a  PAYG  system  which  ought  to  incorporate  the 
compulsory  principle  (as  is  usually  typical). With  an  aging  population,  this  reform  should 
facilitate the introduction of mandatory private savings accounts and initiate the transition to 
fully-funded private pension schemes. The transition should also ensure the better regulation 
of pension funds.  This could be done by enforcing a rigorous compliance with the principles 
actuarial fairness, and opening up private pension funds to foreign competition. 
 
These suggestions present the first step to boosting long-term growth in Slovenia, a process 
which must begin by tackling the legacies of its recent economic history. This paper does not 
provide a definitive account of the mistakes of transition, but instead it attempts to discuss 
the negative consequences of the gradualist preference for maintaining the status quo. This 
has persisted throughout transition, to such an extent that Slovenia has started suffer the 
consequence  of  policies  that  prioritise  social  justice  above  sound  economic  principles.IX. References 
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